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From 2004 to 2008, China's share of the U.S. tire market surged from 4.7% to 16.7%.  Furthermore, be-
tween January and July of 2009, U.S. imported $1.3 billion worth of tires from China.  The U.S. tire pro-
ducers claim that this unprecedented increase in imports of tires from China hurt their industry.  
Consequently, the United States imposed tariffs on Chinese tires for a three-year period (35% in the first 
year, 30% in the second year, and 25% in the third year), in addition to the existing 4% import duty.  
In 2010, China retaliated by imposing anti-dumping duties, ranging from 50.3% to 105.4%.  These retali-
atory tariffs adversely impacted the trade in tires and poultry between the two countries.  U.S. imports of 
Chinese tires declined from $2851 million in 2008 to $2416 million in 2009, and Chinese imports of U.S. 
poultry also fell from $733.48 million in January 2010 to $210.27 million in November 2010. 
2. Objectives 
The objectives of this study are to  
(1)  analyze tariff retaliations using a game theoretical framework,  
(2)  determine the Nash equilibrium tariffs and compare them to the actual tariffs, and  
(3)  estimate the impacts of tariffs on U.S. tires imports and Chinese imports of poultry products.   
3. Methods 
The theoretical model consists of two countries 
(United States and China) and two commodi-
ties (tire and poultry products).   
 The utility preference is given by Cobb-
Douglas function with each country having 
different taste for both commodities.   
 The production function of each good is qua-
siconcave, leading to the production possibil-
ity frontier which is concave to the origin.  
The technology, thus the shape of production 
possibility frontier, differs between the coun-
tries.   
 Using the utility functions, production possi-
bility frontiers, trade balances, tariff reve-
nues, price linkages, and excess demand 
functions, the tariff reaction function is de-
rived for each country.  The reaction func-
tions are solved simultaneously to determine 
the Nash Equilibrium tariffs.   
 Comparative statics analysis show that home 
country tariff is monotonically decreasing in 
both foreign country tariff and foreign coun-
try GDP.  We also provide sufficient condi-
tions for the existence of Nash Equilibrium.  
5. Theoretical Model and Results 



















Comparative Statics Results: 















6. Empirical Analysis 
To empirically implement the theoretical analysis: 
 U.S. excess demand for Chinese tires and China’s excess demand for U.S. poultry are estimated.   
 Explanatory variables are in the excess demand functions are own prices, complementary and 
substitute prices, demand shifters (e.g., income), supply shifters (e.g., input prices), and tariffs.   
 U.S. tire tariff and Chinese poultry tariff equations are estimated.   






















 Since the goodness of fit statistics or R
2 values are very high (0.97 to 0.99), the estimate values accurately pre-
dict the actual data.   
 The empirical results confirm the theoretical results in that the U.S. tariff decreases in China’s tariff and Chi-
nese GDP.  One percent increase in China’s tariff reduces U.S. tariff by 0.11 percent.  One unit increase in Chi-
na’s GDP lowers U.S. tariff by 0.02 percent.   
 Similarly, Chinese tariff also decreases in U.S. tariff and GDP.  One percent increase in U.S. tariff reduces Chi-
na’s tariff by 2.39 percent and one unit increase in U.S. GDP lowers China’s tariff by 0.005 percent.  Using the 
estimated equations, we solve for equilibrium tariffs.  
7. Conclusion 
This paper uses a game theoretical framework to analyze retaliatory tariffs by the United States and China.  The 
theoretical analysis ascertains the Nash equilibrium tariff levels.  The empirical analysis quantifies Nash equilib-
rium tariffs and compares them to the actual tariffs imposed by these two countries.  We also estimate the impacts 
of tariffs on U.S. tires imports and Chinese poultry imports. 
Data Source and Summary Statistics 
The data for the empirical analysis comes from various sources:  
 National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) for U.S. poultry domestic price 
 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) for quantity and value of poultry trade data 
 U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) and World Bank data for U.S. tire import tariff and China poul-
try import tariff 
 GDP data comes from International Financial Statistics.  
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     Coefficient  Std. Error       z  P > z 
US Tariff Equation             
China Tariff**    -0.11    0.04  -2.55  0.01 
US Tire Imports     0.00    0.00   1.60  0.11 
China GDP*    -0.02    0.01  -1.70  0.09 
Poultry Price     0.26    6.20   0.04  0.97 
Dummy 1***   -40.40    4.14  -9.76  0.00 
Dummy 2***   -42.72    4.42  -9.67  0.00 
Constant***    54.52    8.47   6.44  0.00 
R-squared     0.99       
China Tariff Equation         
US Tariff    -2.39    3.20  -0.75  0.46 
China Poultry Imports     0.00    0.00   0.70  0.48 
US GDP**     0.00    0.00  -2.29  0.02 
Poultry Price    -5.54   36.67  -0.15  0.88 
Dummy 1  -118.62   98.87  -1.20  0.23 
Dummy 2  -138.81  102.13  -1.36  0.17 
Constant**   212.90  104.03   2.05  0.04 
R-squared     0.97          
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
U.S. and China  
















U.S. and China 
Trade Tariff 
 Data  
Variable  Obs.        Mean      Std. Dev.         Min         Max 
Trade year  15    2000       5.31  1992     2009 
Weighted US Tariff Rate   15       5.22      8.26     2.22      35 
US Tire Imports (Thousand Dollars)  15  787091.20 896561.50 12378.83 2425585.00 
US GDP (Billion Dollars)  15   10962.30   1688.26  8287.10   13228.90 
Weighted China Tariff Rate   15      27.07     20.12     0.70      74.50 
China Poultry Imports (Thousand Dollars)  15         
China GDP (10 Billions of Dollars)  15     502.66    153.11   317.09     893.78 
Poultry Price (Thousand Dollars/Unit)  15       0.06      0.05     0.01       0.18 
D1  15       0.27      0.46     0        1 
D2  15       0.67      0.49     0        1 